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Alaska Search and Seizure Law vs. Federal Law: Key Differences
Alaska law provides greater privacy protections than federal law, often requiring higher justifications for searches, stops, and seizures under Article I, § 14 (search and seizure) and Article I, § 22 (explicit right to privacy) of the Alaska Constitution. Below are the primary differences, categorized by legal topics, with case citations included inline.
General Constitutional Protections
Alaska Constitution Provides Broader Privacy Rights – Anchorage Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547, 550 (Alaska 2001)
• The Alaska Constitution explicitly guarantees a right to privacy beyond the Fourth Amendment.
• This broader protection may impose stricter limitations on searches, surveillance, and law enforcement authority compared to federal law.
Searches and Privacy Expectations
Electronic Monitoring of a Conversation Without a Warrant is Unconstitutional – State v. Glass, 596 P.2d 10 (Alaska 1979)
•Unlike federal law (United States v. White, 401 U.S. 745 (1971)), Alaska prohibits warrantless electronic monitoring of conversations between informants and suspects.
Aerial Surveillance with High-Powered Optics Constitutes a Search – State v. McKelvey, 544 P.3d 632 (Alaska 2024)
•Federal law (California v. Ciraolo, 476 U.S. 207 (1986)) allows warrantless aerial surveillance of curtilage.
• Alaska requires a warrant for high-powered optical surveillance over private property.
Expectation of Privacy in Garbage – Beltz v. State, 221 P.3d 328 (Alaska 2009)
•Unlike California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), Alaska courts recognize a privacy expectation in garbage placed for collection, requiring reasonable suspicion of a serious crime before police can search it.
Exigent Circumstances Required for Warrantless Vehicle Searches – Clark v. State, 574 P.2d 1261 (Alaska 1978)
• Unlike federal law (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)), Alaska does not automatically allow warrantless vehicle searches based on probable cause unless exigent circumstances exist.
Traffic Stops and Vehicle Searches
Questioning and Consent Searches During Traffic Stops Require Reasonable Suspicion – Duty v. State, 532 P.3d 742 (Alaska Ct. App. 2023)
• Unlike Ohio v. Robinette, 519 U.S. 33 (1996), Alaska prohibits officers from asking about unrelated crimes or seeking consent to search unless supported by reasonable suspicion.
Pretextual Stops May Violate the State Constitution – Chase v. State, 243 P.3d 1014 (Alaska Ct. App. 2010)
• Unlike Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), Alaska courts may invalidate traffic stops if the officer’s stated reason deviates significantly from standard police practices.
Uncertainty Over Mimms and Wilson Standards – Perozzo v. State, 493 P.3d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021)
•It remains undecided whether Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), align with Alaska constitutional protections.
Passenger ID Requests Without Cause Are Unconstitutional – Perozzo v. State, 493 P.3d 233 (Alaska Ct. App. 2021)
• Unlike federal law, Alaska prohibits officers from asking for passenger ID and running a check unless there is particularized suspicion or a traffic-mission-related reason.
Terry Stops and Seizures
Terry Stops Limited to Imminent Public Danger or Serious Harm – Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
•Federal law (Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)) allows stops based on reasonable suspicion of criminal activity.
• Alaska requires a higher standard, limiting Terry stops to situations involving imminent public danger or recent serious harm.
Alaska Rejects Hodari D., Meaning a Seizure Occurs Even Without Physical Submission – Joseph v. State, 145 P.3d 595 (Alaska Ct. App. 2006)
• Unlike California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), Alaska courts consider a seizure to occur even if a suspect has not physically submitted to police authority.
Search Incident to Arrest
Limited to Weapons or Offense-Related Evidence – Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977)
• Unlike United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), Alaska courts limit search incident to arrest to weapons or evidence directly related to the arrest offense.
Emergency Aid Doctrine
Stricter Standards for Residential Entry Under Emergency Aid Doctrine – State v. Gibson, 267 P.3d 645 (Alaska 2012)
•Unlike federal law (Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U.S. 398 (2006)), Alaska requires courts to consider the officer’s subjective intent when determining the validity of an emergency aid entry.
Inventory Searches
Closed Containers Cannot Be Routinely Opened – Reeves v. State, 599 P.2d 727 (Alaska 1979)
• Unlike federal law (Illinois v. Lafayette, 462 U.S. 640 (1983)), Alaska limits inventory searches and does not allow automatic opening of closed containers.
Opportunity to Post Bail Before Booking and Inventory Search – Zehrung v. State, 569 P.2d 189 (Alaska 1977)
• Unlike federal practice, Alaska requires giving arrestees a reasonable chance to post bail before subjecting them to booking and inventory searches for minor offenses.
Locked Luggage and Containers in Vehicles Cannot Be Inventoried – State v. Daniel, 589 P.2d 408 (Alaska 1979)
• Federal law allows inventory searches of all items within an impounded vehicle.
• Alaska courts prohibit opening closed, locked, or sealed luggage and containers during an inventory search.
Public Employee Drug Testing
Greater Restrictions on Suspicionless Drug Testing of Public Employees – Anchorage Police Dep’t Emps. Ass’n v. Municipality of Anchorage, 24 P.3d 547 (Alaska 2001)
• Unlike federal law (National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989)), Alaska places stricter limitations on random drug testing of public employees.
Consent to search a dwelling must advise right to refuse. State v. Brown, 156 S.W.3d 722 (2004). No pretextual arrests. State v. Sullivan, 348 Ark. 647 (2002)
Articulable individualized suspicion is required, under the Indiana Constitution, for officers to search trash.
Litchfield v. State, 824 N.E.2d 356 (Ind. 2005)
Searches and Privacy Expectations
• Short-term residential guests (non-overnight) have a reasonable expectation of privacy in the residence.
•In re Welfare of B.R.K., 658 N.W.2d 565 (Minn. 2003)
• Exterior sniff of a storage unit is a search, requiring reasonable suspicion.
•State v. Carter, 697 N.W.2d 199 (Minn. 2005)
• Sniff of an apartment door in a common hallway is a search, requiring reasonable suspicion.
•State v. Davis, 732 N.W.2d 173 (Minn. 2007)
Traffic Stops and Vehicle Searches
• Need reasonable suspicion to deploy a canine on a traffic stop (regardless of time extension, it’s a scope extension).
•State v. Wiegand, 645 N.W.2d 125 (Minn. 2002)
• No sobriety checkpoints permitted.
•Ascher v. Comm’r of Pub. Safety, 519 N.W.2d 183 (Minn. 1994)
Terry Stops and Seizures
•Minnesota declines to follow Hodari D., meaning a seizure occurs even if the suspect has not physically submitted to police authority.
•Matter of Welfare of E.D.J., 502 N.W.2d 779 (Minn. 1993)
Good Faith Exception and Police Databases
•No good faith reliance on a quashed warrant that still appeared on police databases (declining to follow Herring).
•State v. Malecha, 3 N.W.3d 566 (Minn. 2024)
Checkpoints and Traffic Stops
• Checkpoints are limited by statute.
•MCA 46-5-502
• Exit orders on traffic stops might require more justification.
•State v. Roy, 369 Mont. 173 (2013)
Searches and Privacy Expectations
• Canine sniff is considered a “search.”
•State v. Wilson, 393 Mont. 238 (2018)
• Reasonable expectation of privacy extends to some land beyond curtilage.
•State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361 (1995)
Standing and Consent
• Automatic standing applies for possessory crimes.
•State v. Bullock, 272 Mont. 361 (1995)
• Actual authority is required for consent to search.
•State v. McLees, 298 Mont. 15 (2000)
Search Incident to Arrest (SITA)
• SITA requires exigency under state statute.
•State v. Hardaway, 307 Mont. 139 (2001)
Topic | New Mexico Approach (Case) | Federal Approach (Case) |
Garbage Searches | Expectation of privacy (State v. Granville, 140 N.M. 345 (2006)) | No expectation (California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988)) |
Vehicle Searches | Probable cause + exigency (State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777 (1997)) | Probable cause alone (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)) |
Pretextual Stops | Prohibited (State v. Ochoa, 146 N.M. 32 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Gonzales, 150 N.M. 74 (2011)) | Allowed (Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996)) |
Good Faith Exception | Rejected (State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 (1993)) | Accepted (United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984)) |
Consent Searches | Actual authority required (State v. Wright, 119 N.M. 559 (Ct. App. 1995)) | Apparent authority allowed (Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990)) |
Search Incident to Arrest | Limited to access possibility (State v. Rowell, 144 N.M. 371 (2008)) | Automatic search (New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981); limited by Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009)) |
Inventory Search of Closed Containers | Limited, case-by-case reasonableness (State v. Jim, 508 P.3d 937 (N.M. 2022)) | Permitted under policy (Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987)) |
Seizures | Based on show of authority (State v. Garcia, 147 N.M. 134 (2009)) | Requires submission (California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991) |
General Constitutional Interpretations
State Constitution May Provide Greater Protections – State v. Garcia, 147 N.M. 134, 142 (2009)
•Under the interstitial approach, New Mexico courts may depart from federal precedent when the federal analysis is flawed, when structural differences exist, or when unique New Mexico characteristics require it.
Searches and Privacy Expectations
Expectation of Privacy in Garbage – State v. Granville, 140 N.M. 345 (2006)
•Unlike California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), New Mexico recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage set out for collection.
Warrantless Vehicle Searches Require Exigency – State v. Gomez, 122 N.M. 777 (1997)
• Unlike the federal automobile exception (California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991)), New Mexico requires both probable cause and a particularized exigency for warrantless vehicle searches.
Potential Rejection of Open Fields Doctrine – State v. Sutton, 112 N.M. 449 (1991)
•Unlike Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), New Mexico indicated in dicta that the open fields doctrine may conflict with state constitutional privacy rights.
Closed Containers in Inventory Searches Cannot Be Automatically Opened – State v. Jim, 508 P.3d 937 (N.M. 2022)
• Unlike Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), New Mexico courts will assess reasonableness independently of agency policy, and locked containers require stronger justification before being searched.
Warrants and Probable Cause
Two-Prong Aguilar-Spinelli Test Required for Warrants – State v. Cordova, 109 N.M. 211 (1989)
• Unlike Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), New Mexico requires informant tips to meet both prongs of the Aguilar-Spinelli test (basis of knowledge and veracity).
Exclusionary Rule and Good Faith Exception
No Good Faith Exception to State Exclusionary Rule – State v. Gutierrez, 116 N.M. 431 (1993)
•Unlike United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984), New Mexico rejects a good faith exception under the state constitution.
Traffic Stops and Roadblocks
Roadblocks Require More Than Federal Standard – State v. Madalena, 121 N.M. 63 (Ct. App. 1995)
•Unlike Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), New Mexico imposes stricter requirements for roadblocks, including advance notice and specific safety measures.
Pretextual Stops Violate State Constitution – State v. Ochoa, 146 N.M. 32 (Ct. App. 2008); State v. Gonzales, 150 N.M. 74 (2011)
•Unlike Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), New Mexico prohibits pretextual stops where the “real” reason is unsupported by reasonable suspicion.
Traffic Stop Questioning Requires Scope Limitation – State v. Leyva, 149 N.M. 435 (2011)
•Unlike Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323 (2009), New Mexico limits questions during stops to those reasonably related to the stop’s purpose.
Arrests and Searches Incident to Arrest
Probable Cause + Exigency Required for Warrantless Arrests – Campos v. State, 117 N.M. 155 (1994)
•Unlike federal law, New Mexico requires both probable cause and exigent circumstances for warrantless arrests.
However, PC and authority to arrest is exigency unless police knew about the PC beforehand.
{26} The phrase “exigent circumstances” has been described in our jurisprudence as including “an emergency situation requiring swift action to prevent imminent danger to life or serious damage to property, or to forestall the imminent escape of a suspect or destruction of evidence.” Campos, 1994–NMSC–012, ¶ 11, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (quoting State v. Copeland, 1986–NMCA–083, ¶ 14, 105 N.M. 27, 727 P.2d 1342). The Court of Appeals appears to have relied upon this language in finding a lack of exigency when it reviewed this case below. See Paananen, 2014–NMCA–041, ¶¶ 32–36, 321 P.3d 945. The quoted language, however, is not an exclusive list. As Campos provides—and we now hold—there are other situations in which an exigency not necessarily amounting to an imminent threat of danger, escape, or lost evidence will be sufficient to render reasonable a warrantless public *965 arrest supported by probable cause under the totality of the circumstances. See Campos, 1994–NMSC–012, ¶ 14, 117 N.M. 155, 870 P.2d 117 (declaring that “exigency will be presumed” where an officer observes the commission of a felony, without reference to imminent danger, escape, or destruction of evidence). An on-the-scene arrest supported by probable cause will usually supply the requisite exigency.
State v. Paananen, 2015-NMSC-031, ¶ 26, 357 P.3d 958, 964–65
Rejecting Atwater for Non-Jailable Offenses – State v. Rodarte, 138 N.M. 668 (Ct. App. 2005)
•Unlike Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318 (2001), New Mexico limits arrests for minor offenses without additional justification.
Rejecting Belton’s Bright Line Rule; Limiting Vehicle Searches Incident to Arrest – State v. Rowell, 144 N.M. 371 (2008)
• Unlike New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981), New Mexico requires actual possibility of access to the vehicle, even post-Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009).
Statutory Arrest Violations Require Suppression – State v. Bricker, 139 N.M. 513 (Ct. App. 2006)
•Unlike Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164 (2008), New Mexico mandates suppression when arrest violates statutory procedures.
Terry Stops and Border Checkpoints
Secondary Screening Requires Reasonable Suspicion – State v. Cardenas-Alvarez, 130 N.M. 386 (2001)
•Unlike United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S. 543 (1976), New Mexico requires at least reasonable suspicion for secondary screening at border checkpoints.
Consent Searches
Actual Authority Required for Consent – State v. Wright, 119 N.M. 559 (Ct. App. 1995)
•Unlike Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), New Mexico requires actual authority, not just apparent authority, for third-party consent to be valid.
Seizures and Police-Citizen Encounters
Rejection of Hodari D.; Seizure Occurs Without Physical Submission – State v. Garcia, 147 N.M. 134 (2009)
• Unlike California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), New Mexico recognizes a seizure occurs based on a show of authority alone, even without suspect submission.
Oregon’s Article I, § 9 of the Oregon Constitution provides stronger privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, often requiring higher justifications for searches, stops, and seizures. Below are the key differences, categorized by legal topics, with case citations included inline.
General Constitutional Protections
Oregon’s Reasonable Expectation of Privacy (REP) Test is Slightly Different – State v. Newcomb, 359 Or. 756 (2016)
• While similar to Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), Oregon’s test for REP considers societal expectations and the individual’s relationship with the searched item differently than federal law.
No Open Fields Doctrine, Privacy Analysis Required for Land Beyond Curtilage – State v. Dixson, 307 Or. 195 (1988)
• Unlike Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), Oregon does not recognize the open fields doctrine and instead evaluates whether a person has a privacy interest in land beyond the curtilage.
Expectation of Privacy in Garbage Set Out for Collection – State v. Lien, 364 Or. 750 (2019)
• Unlike California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), Oregon recognizes a privacy interest in garbage placed for collection, requiring a warrant for its search.
Seizure and Probable Cause
Definition of “Seizure” of a Person is Slightly Different – State v. Ashbaugh, 349 Or. 297 (2010)
• Unlike United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980), Oregon requires a stronger demonstration of control by law enforcement before a person is considered “seized”.
Oregon Has Not Expressly Addressed Whether It Follows Hodari D. – State v. Puffenbarger, 166 Or. App. 426 (2000)
• The Oregon Supreme Court has not explicitly ruled on California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), but there is no direct precedent requiring a suspect’s physical submission for a seizure to occur.
Probable Cause Has a Subjective Component – State v. Nagel, 320 Or. 24 (1994) (Dictum)
• Unlike Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983), Oregon suggests that an officer’s subjective belief may be relevant to determining probable cause.
Traffic Stops and Vehicle Searches
A Traffic Stop for an Infraction is Not a Seizure of the Passengers – State v. Stevens, 364 Or. 91 (2018)
• Unlike Brendlin v. California, 551 U.S. 249 (2007), Oregon does not automatically consider passengers seized during a traffic stop.
Whether Mimms and Wilson Apply is Questionable – State v. Stevens, 364 Or. 91 (2018)
•It is unclear whether Pennsylvania v. Mimms, 434 U.S. 106 (1977), and Maryland v. Wilson, 519 U.S. 408 (1997), align with Oregon’s constitutional protections.
No Automobile Exception; Actual Exigency Required – State v. McCarthy, 369 Or. 129 (2021)
• Unlike California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), Oregon requires a true exigency before conducting a warrantless search of a vehicle.
Limitations on Vehicle Inventory Searches; Notice to Remove Items Required – State v. Fulmer, 366 Or. 224 (2020)
• Unlike Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), Oregon requires law enforcement to provide notice before conducting an inventory search of a vehicle’s contents.
Subject-Matter Limitation on Investigative Inquiries During a Traffic Stop – State v. Arreola-Botello, 365 Or. 695 (2019)
• Unlike Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), Oregon restricts questioning during a traffic stop to subjects directly related to the purpose of the stop.
Consent Searches
Scope of Consent is Determined by the Person’s Actual Intent – State v. Blair, 361 Or. 527 (2017)
• Unlike Florida v. Jimeno, 500 U.S. 248 (1991), Oregon determines the scope of consent based on the individual’s actual intent rather than an officer’s reasonable belief.
Actual Authority Required for Valid Consent – State v. Bonilla, 358 Or. 475 (2015)
• Unlike Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990), Oregon requires third-party consent to be based on actual authority, not just apparent authority.
Search Incident to Arrest (SITA)
Limitation on Scope of Search Incident to Arrest; No Robinson Bright-Line Rule – State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196 (1986)
• Unlike United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218 (1973), Oregon does not apply a blanket rule allowing a full search incident to arrest.
Potential Expansion of SITA Scope Contrary to Post-Gant Federal Holdings – State v. Owens, 302 Or. 196 (1986)
• Oregon’s case law may allow broader searches incident to arrest than post-Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), federal circuit court interpretations.
Washington Search and Seizure Law: Key Differences from Federal Law
Washington’s Article I, § 7 of the Washington Constitution provides stronger privacy protections than the Fourth Amendment, often requiring higher standards for searches, stops, and seizures. Below are the key differences, categorized by legal topics, with case citations included inline.
General Constitutional Protections
Washington Constitution Provides Broader Privacy Protections – State v. Gunwall, 106 Wash.2d 54 (1986)
•Washington declines to follow Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979), and recognizes greater privacy protections under its state constitution, particularly for telephone records and other personal data.
Open Fields Entitled to Constitutional Protection – State v. Myrick, 102 Wash.2d 506 (1984)
• Unlike Oliver v. United States, 466 U.S. 170 (1984), Washington provides privacy protections for open fields, rejecting the federal open fields doctrine.
Expectation of Privacy in Trash Set Out for Collection – State v. Boland, 115 Wash.2d 571 (1990)
• Unlike California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35 (1988), Washington recognizes a reasonable expectation of privacy in garbage, prohibiting warrantless trash searches.
Suspicionless Hotel Guest Registry Viewing is Unconstitutional – State v. Jorden, 160 Wash.2d 121 (2007)
• Unlike United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976), Washington prohibits law enforcement from inspecting hotel guest registries without a warrant.
Search and Consent Rules
Private Search Doctrine is Incompatible with the Washington Constitution – State v. Eisfeldt, 163 Wash.2d 628 (2008)
• Unlike federal law, Washington does not permit law enforcement to benefit from private searches without independent constitutional scrutiny.
Actual Authority Required for Consent – State v. Morse, 156 Wash.2d 1 (2005)
•Third-party consent must be based on actual authority, not apparent authority, conflicting with Illinois v. Rodriguez, 497 U.S. 177 (1990).
Affirmative Duty to Seek Consent from Co-Inhabitants – State v. Morse, 156 Wash.2d 1 (2005)
• Unlike Georgia v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), Washington requires officers to seek consent from a present inhabitant of equal or greater authority before searching shared spaces.
Knock and Talk Consent Warnings Required – State v. Ferrier, 136 Wash.2d 103 (1998)
• Before conducting a consent search during a knock and talk, officers must inform the resident of their right to refuse, revoke, or limit consent.
Traffic Stops and Vehicle Searches
Pretextual Traffic Stops Violate the Washington Constitution – State v. Ladson, 138 Wash.2d 343 (1999)
• Unlike Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806 (1996), Washington prohibits pretextual traffic stops, requiring officers to cite an actual reason for the stop.
Mixed-Motive Traffic Stops Permissible if Independent Justification Exists – State v. Arreola, 176 Wash.2d 284 (2012)
• Officers may conduct a traffic stop for both a legitimate infraction and a secondary motive, as long as the primary reason is legitimate and independent.
Requesting ID from a Passenger Requires Justification – State v. Rankin, 151 Wash.2d 689 (2004)
• Unlike federal law, Washington prohibits officers from requesting identification from passengers without particularized justification.
Ordering a Passenger to Stay in or Exit a Vehicle Requires an Articulable Safety Rationale – State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486 (1999)
• Unlike federal law, Washington requires officers to justify orders for passengers to remain in or exit a vehicle based on objective safety concerns.
No Automobile Exception, True Exigency Required for Warrantless Vehicle Searches – State v. Snapp, 174 Wash.2d 177 (2012)
•Unlike California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565 (1991), Washington does not recognize a blanket automobile exception and requires true exigency for a warrantless vehicle search.
Locked Trunks Cannot Be Opened in an Inventory Search – State v. White, 135 Wash.2d 761 (1998)
• Unlike Colorado v. Bertine, 479 U.S. 367 (1987), Washington prohibits the opening of locked trunks during an inventory search.
Search Incident to Arrest of a Non-Arrested Passenger’s Possessions is Prohibited – State v. Parker, 139 Wash.2d 486 (1999)
• Unlike Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295 (1999), Washington does not allow officers to search personal belongings clearly associated with a non-arrested vehicle occupant.
Gant Offense-Related Evidence Search is Unconstitutional – State v. Snapp, 174 Wash.2d 177 (2012)
• Unlike Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332 (2009), Washington provides even stricter limits on searching a vehicle incident to arrest.
Terry Stops and Seizures
No Terry Stops for Civil Infractions – State v. Day, 161 Wash.2d 889 (2007)
• Unlike Hiibel v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court, 542 U.S. 177 (2004), Washington prohibits stops based solely on civil infractions.
Washington Rejects Hodari D., Seizure Occurs Without Physical Submission – State v. Young, 135 Wash.2d 498 (1998)
• Unlike California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621 (1991), Washington recognizes a seizure when police exercise control, regardless of whether the suspect submits.
Search Incident to Arrest (SITA) and Exclusionary Rule
Actual Custodial Arrest Required for SITA – State v. O’Neill, 148 Wash.2d 564 (2003)
• Unlike Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980), Washington requires an actual custodial arrest before a search incident to arrest can occur.
Broader SITA Authority for Carried Belongings, Following a “Time of Arrest” Rule – State v. Byrd, 178 Wash.2d 611 (2013)
• Washington allows searches of items carried by an arrestee if the search occurs at the time of arrest.
No Inevitable Discovery Exception to the Exclusionary Rule – State v. Winterstein, 167 Wash.2d 620 (2009)
• Unlike Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984), Washington does not recognize inevitable discovery as an exception to the exclusionary rule.
No Good Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule – State v. Afana, 169 Wash.2d 169 (2010)
• Unlike Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), Washington does not recognize good faith reliance on existing precedent as an exception to the exclusionary rule.
More Narrow Application of the Attenuation Doctrine – State v. Mayfield, 192 Wash.2d 871 (2019)
• Washington applies stricter requirements before allowing evidence to be admitted under the attenuation doctrine.
Special Cases: Public Safety and Home Entries
Sobriety Checkpoints Violate the Washington Constitution – City of Seattle v. Mesiani, 110 Wash.2d 454 (1988)
• Unlike Michigan Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990), Washington prohibits suspicionless sobriety checkpoints.
No Pretextual Use of Arrest Warrants for Home Searches – State v. Hatchie, 161 Wash.2d 390 (2007)
• Unlike Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573 (1980), officers may not use an arrest warrant as a pretext to search for evidence inside a home.
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